The origins of Wall Street are tied to Alexander Hamilton's plans for the financing of the new nation and the funding of its debt. The two hundredth anniversary of Wall Street in 1992 occasioned many retrospectives that owe more to mythology than to historical veracity. Wall Street's earliest history consists of market corners, insider trading, and financial scandal that implicated the high (Alexander Hamilton) and the low (William Duer). The 1792 Wall Street response was in the form of private self-regulation in order to hold off governmental regulation, setting a precedent for public policy that carries well into the twentieth century. Using new historical methodology, this article reinterprets the formative financial period of 1790-1792 and the origins of Wall Street.
America, author of sixty-three of the eighty-five essays in the Federalist Papers, and Wall Street habitue whose name has been implicated by some historians, and defended by others, in the financial crisis that followed on his plan to fund the Revolutionary War debt. What was Hamilton's role in the financial speculation and its subsequent cycle of public infatuation and betrayal? Did he pass information, knowingly or unknowingly, to some of his closest friends, associates, and, in one instance, possibly his deputy in the Treasury who used the information about the funding scheme to enrich themselves and seduce an unsuspecting public into Wall Street's first financial scandal? After two centuries of off-and-on debate about Hamilton's involvement, there is still no direct evidence that can resolve the debate. It is, however, worth looking at this question once more in light of an historic marker and new historical methodology.
The marker is the passing of Wall Street's second century as a financial center. 2 The methodology is associated with a new historiography that challenges the solidity of most "facts", looks at historical evidence as not subject to de-coupling from its source, and gives as much weight to perceptions about events --the play of surfaces --as it does to the event itself, which is subject to multiple interpretations. This matrix of historical method suits a Wall Street that is itself a wonder of perceptions about a contested reality, multiple interpretation of "facts", each dependent upon the orientation and reputation of the presenter, and decisions based upon a surface that may or may not reflect its underlying reality. Hamilton was himself aware of this when he said that "in nothing are appearances of greater moment, than in whatever regards credit.
Opinion is the soul of it, and this is affected by appearances, as well as realities." The decision to center so much of British colonial life on Wall Street was influenced by the appointed British Governor of New York, Thomas Dongan, who had secretly purchased rights to the land adjacent to the wall before it was paved and then subdivided his holdings into lots which he sold in 1686. 4 He was joined in this land speculation by two of The Street's early great names: Nicholas Bayard and Abraham DePeyster. They bought property near Wall Street before it was improved, proposed a site for Trinity Church, and donated the land on which the City Hall was built. 5 In the last decade of the 1600s, the old wooden palisade wall was demolished and its foundation stones used in the construction of City Hall, Wall Street was paved, and the first Trinity Church was built. 6 Colonial Wall Street, in the 1700s, kept pace with the growth of New York City as a trade center and port city and was content, during the American Revolution, to view the battles from some distance. New York was still a modest third to Philadelphia and Boston in finance and patriotic fervor. By the end of the century, with the city's population standing at over thirty-one thousand, a rebuilt Trinity Church was consecrated (1791) and towered over a street that contained fifty-four merchant businesses, a school teacher, a clockmaker, a snuff and tobacco manufacturer, a grocer, bookseller, milliner, printer, upholsterer, two tailors, three auctioneers, a tavern, a porter house, and a fashionable boarding house.
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The most prominent of all these residents in the early republic was Alexander Hamilton.
He had a small house at the corner of Wall and Water Streets near the Coffee House Slip on the East River, which he frequently visited. 8 Hamilton was confident that the character of the new nation would be defined as much by the system that produced and distributed articles of commerce as by articles in the Constitution. Hamilton saw his role, according to one interpretation, as closer to that of a prime minister in Washington's presidency than simply that of a treasury secretary. Hamilton's remedy, outlined in his Report, contained three essentials: First redemption of the "Continentals" --as the currency was called --at face value even though they were worth a fraction of face value on the current market. Second, he proposed that the federal government assume all the outstanding state debts. Together, these measures became known as the funding and assumption policies of the new federal treasury. Third, he borrowed money for the new federal treasury by issuing federal government bonds. The end result, Hamilton hoped, was an old debt wiped off the books and worthless currency removed from circulation, a new currency with stable value, and money to finance the government. This took some sleight of hand, to say the least, and perhaps some privileged information passed to brokers who were essential in executing the project.
To implement this policy Hamilton first issued a new currency, which he used to buy the Continentals on a one-for-one basis. He then issued some eighty million dollars in federal government bonds and sold them primarily to merchants and brokers, who bought the bonds with the new currency they had received for the old Continentals. In effect, brokers swapped the The scandal originates in Hamilton's funding and assumption measures, which were controversial on several counts. A significant segment of opinion at the time questioned why the buyers of Continentals --who had purchased on speculation from their original owners at considerably less than face value --should be paid at face value? Many of the original holders of Continentals had dumped them for whatever they could get. They were soldiers who had been paid in Continentals, or farmers and tradesmen who had sold goods to the army, or soldiers and suppliers who were still awaiting payment from the government.
The buyers of these apparently worthless Continentals were often rich and powerful merchants who snuggled along the coast lines of the port cities and dabbled in whatever could be bought at a low price and sold at a higher price. The sellers were individuals such as the veteran who wrote this letter to the Massachusetts Centinel on 20 March 1790, describing the plight of his fellow soldiers:
They must dispose of their ...pay, or they must go hungry. What was the encouragement when they offered their paper for sale? That government would never be able to pay it, and that it was not worth more than 2s. for 20s. This was the language of all the purchasers.
The speculative perspective was captured by an early historian of Wall Street: "The wily hastened to the highways and byways and bought up, at remarkably low prices, the Government formulation --that the soldier need only apply for his Continentals, now worth a considerable sum in 1792 --with a bureaucratic nightmare. The individual soldier not only had to apply for back payment, according to the revised rules, but now also had to produce a document from an officer with whom the soldier had served, proving his identity. But even that was not enough.
When twenty-two such statements were presented and signed by one officer, several claims were turned down on the basis of the individual soldier having served in a different regiment; or claims for dead soldiers, upon investigation, showed the individual alive and well. All this points to a general confusion over who had title to back pay claims and how they were to be awarded, not to mention the difficulties an individual faced when confronting a government that was prepared to place such a bureaucratic maze in his way.
The willingness of "wily" brokers to buy what everyone else considered worthless paper leads to an obvious query: Was information concerning his scheme to purchase Continentals at face value and assume state debt passed on through or by Hamilton to his merchant friends?
How did the buyers of the Continentals know they would be redeemed at par? The evidentiary record points toward the conclusion that the first market for government securities was created by interested parties with special information. One observer, for example, attributed speculators' I dined with Hamilton on Saturday. He is strong in the faith of maintaining public Credit .... I tried him on the subject ... `they must no doubt be funded tho it cannot be done immediately,' was his remark, `they must all be put upon a footing,' meaning these as well as the funded Debt. In short I am more & more of the opinion that they are the best object at present. Merely because I retained an opinion once common to me and the most influential of those who opposed me, that the public debt ought to be provided for on the basis of the contract upon which it was created, I have been wickedly accused with wantonly increasing the public burthen many millions in order to promote a stock-jobbing interest of myself and friends. He would want to take every precaution to avoid their recurrence. One way to do this would be to prepare for contingencies in advance, for example, by limiting speculation largely to a trusted group inside a wall of privileged information, leaving those beyond the barrier to nibble on the residual crumbs from the main speculation. To put the question in the negative: How could
Hamilton not know that the gambles of private speculators would make or break his project, depending on whether they "guessed" correctly about a policy whose success he valued at whatever the cost? The strategy behind such a maneuver is to buy up as much of the stock of an institution as possible at a price that has been driven down, remove the factors that drove down the stock's price, then sell the stock once the price has risen. With ownership concentrated, the cornerers hope to be able to manipulate the stock's price to their advantage. The trick is to keep the stock price low, at the same time the cornerers are exalting its demand by buying more. For this they have to find a device at the outset to drive the stock price down and be able to keep it low enough and long enough for the corner to be profitably secured. In the Duer corner the mechanism involved a clever ruse that was designed to convince financiers a new bank was being created to compete with the Bank of New York, thereby deflating the price of that bank's securities. I think I know you too well to ... harbour the most distant thought that you would wander from the path either of public good or private integrity. But I will honestly own I had serious fears for you --for your purse and for your reputation...
Upon subsequently learning of the Duer scheme to add a competitive bank to the Bank of New York, Hamilton was enraged both for reasons of pride and his concern that another bank would lead to an overextension of credit, thereby jeopardizing his grand plan for establishing the creditworthiness of the new nation. He collaborated with William Seton, cashier of the Bank of New York, to deprive Duer and his accomplices of access to the bank by refusing to accept their deposits. The Bank of New York tightened credit and curtailed the discounting of paper, which had the effect of retarding Duer's scheme to buy up bank securities but also brought on the very financial panic Hamilton had wanted to avoid.
With interest payable at from two to four percent per month, any interruption of a cash flow is deadly. Almost immediately after Hamilton's counter-attack through the Bank of New York, Duer and Pintard were forced to default. Once the word got out, they were besieged by creditors wanting to be paid off while they still could, but it was too late. On 9 March 1792 Duer stopped payment on the notes. In an effort to deflect responsibility away from himself and toward Pintard, he said they were "issued by my Agent during my absence, under Circumstances which require Investigation." As panic took over the city and angry mobs demanded retribution, Duer was fortunate to be placed in jail. The turmoil was captured in this account:
There is scarcely anything but Noise and Racket last night and the night before we had a Mob Raised and nothing would satisfy them but the father of Speculation, the great W.
[Duer] who is confined in gaol at present and who they blame for carrying off all the money from this city, and the cause of many failures that has happened. Lately, the Mob has endeavored to get him out of gaol, but the Mayor & city officers have prevented them as yetalmost one half of this city is turned Bankrupt, owing to the Cursed Speculation.
Said his colleague William Constable of Duer: His "talents are confessed and his information and resource superior to any Man I ever knew but he cannot go straight." To avoid creditors, Pintard retreated to Newark, New Jersey where he sought absolution by claiming he had made an "error" in having "unfounded confidence in Mr. Duer, while acting as his agent." Pintard remained in Newark for eight years, of which fourteen months was spent in jail between 1797 and 1798. These reverses and his confinement may have made him introspective. As a self-professed rational man, he was able to separate his personal financial disaster from his observations of nature and politics. Pintard became a diarist during his exile and produced perhaps the most detailed record of daily life from the period that has been preserved.
Alexander Macomb, foreshadowing the repentance of later Wall Street schemers who get caught, lamented:
Three months past in this city every face was blythe, everything seemed to flourish, all had favourable prospects and everything look'd well. At present every countenance is gloomy, all confidence between individuals is lost, credit at a stand, and distress and general Bankruptcy to be daily expected --for everyone gambled more or less in these cursed Speculations.
The Invention of Wall Street
The Duer-Pintard financial scandal was one of the proximate events that led to the Buttonwood Agreement, as brokers sought to pacify an angry public by devising rules for securities' markets that preempted public regulation and left self-regulation of financial markets under their control. It was partially an effort to hold off government intervention after the New response to a financial crisis to bring some order and respectability to an institution in disrepute after the Duer scandal. While Wall Street produced early financiers who saw themselves as responsible and benevolent, it also gave rise to frenzied speculation orchestrated by schemers and scoundrels who anticipated many of the mea culpas of subsequent fallen financial angels. And, finally, it threw forth a great cultural interpreter --John Pintard --whose efforts at preserving and sponsoring American art and literacy are another Wall Street contribution to the nation. His greatest achievement was the establishment of the New York Historical Society in 1804 where his papers, letters, and diaries reside. His death at age 86 in 1844 ended a career that is best described by an 1870 profile of him:
He could ignite a handbill that would inflame the minds of people for any good work. He could call a meeting with the pen of a poet, and before the people met, he would have arranged the doings for a perfect success. He knew the weak point of every man, and he would gratify the vanity of men and get their money, and accomplish his good purpose, without any of them suspecting they were merely the respectable names and moneyed tools that Mr. Pintard required.
The basic character of an institution is often established in its infancy. Such is the case during the early years of Wall Street. In its first two years a cycle of euphoria, speculation, and panic is accompanied by the public's infatuation then sense of betrayal, followed by reform and redemption. 
